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The Role of Eyewitness Accounts in Establishing Probable
Cause for the Issuance of Search Warrants-Manley U.
Commonwealth
The legality of entry gained through the use of a search warrant is
dependent upon the legality of the means used to obtain the warrant.' To
justify the issuance of a search warrant the affiant must show the existence
of probable cause.2
Probable cause may be shown by the use of information supplied by
informants.' The courts have, however, in permitting the use of such
'2 See, e.g., McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1969).
See, e.g, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Hanger v. United
States, 428 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1970); Oliver v. State, - Ala. App. -, 238 So. 2d
916 (1970); People v. Rogers, 15 N.Y.2d 422, 208 N.E.2d 168, 260 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1965),
Though the United States Constitution provides that warrants will issue only where
probable cause has been shown, it gives no indication of what is necessary to show
probable cause. See generally Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant,
67 CoLUm. L. REv. 1529 (1967).
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
See Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962). In this case is one of
the most widely accepted definitions of probable cause. The court stated:
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed. Id. at 320.
While probable cause may be shown by evidence insufficient to justify conviction,
it must consist of more than mere suspicion or rumor. United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965).
sSee, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); United States v.
Gray, 429 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1970); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir.
1966); United States v. Manetti, 309 F. Supp. 174 (D. Del. 1970); Oliver v. State,
- Ala. App. -, 238 So. 2d 916 (1970); People v. Schmidt, - Colo. -, 473 P.
2d 698 (1970); Ward v. State, 9 Md. App. 583, 267 A.2d 255 (1970). Contra, Ferry v.
State, - Ind. -, 262 NE.2d 523 (1970).
For a discussion of informers, the history of informer activity and informer privilege,
see 8 J. WGMoRE, EvIDENcE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Donnelly, Judicial Control
of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provaocateurs,60 YAr LEJ. 1091 (1951);
Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: ProbableCause and the Informer Privilege, 45 DEN. L.J. 399
(1968); Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YArE L.J.-206 (1953).
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hearsay, required that the officer making application provide a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay."
To test the sufficiency of an affidavit based totally or in part on hearsay
the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v. Texas has been followed by the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions.5 The Aguilar test6 requires
that to show probable cause the affiant making application must ( 1) provide
the "underlying circumstances" necessary for a magistrate to determine
how the informant arrived at his conclusions, and (2) show that the informant is credible or that the information given by him can be relied on.
In Manley v. Commonwealth7 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that an informant's statement of facts as an "eyewitness" fulfilled
both of Aguilar's requirements, and was therefore sufficient to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.' The affidavit was based
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Meeks, 313 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Wood,
270 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State ex rel. Attorney General v. State, - Ala.
-, 237 So. 2d 640 (1970); People v. Perlman, - Ill. App. 2d -, 262 N.E.2d 253
(1970). Accord, United States v. Simon, 409 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1969); Coyne v.
Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio, 1967).
See generally Comment, Informer's Word as The Basis for Probable Cause in the
Federal Courts, 53 CAIF. L. REv. 840 (1965); Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable
Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958 (1969); 1967 DUKE L.J. 888.
BSee, e.g., Hanger v. United States, 428 F. 2d 746 (8th Cir. 1970); United States
ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970); Oliver v. State, - Ala. App.
-, 238 So. 2d 916 (1970); State v. Castro, - Ariz. App. -, 475 P.2d 725 (1970);
State v. Toce, 6 Conn. Cir. 192, 269 A.2d 421 (1969); People v. Perlman, - Ill. App.
2d -, 262 NE.2d 253 (1970); People v. Massey, 38 Misc. 2d 403, 238 N.Y.S.2d 531
(1963); Commonwealth v. Robinson, - Pa. Super. -, 269 A.2d 332 (1970).
6Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Court stated:
[TIhe magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed
they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant . . . was "credible" or his information "reliable".
Id. at 114.
Though it left the wording of the Aguilar test intact, Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969), decided five years later, gave further clarification and refinement
to the principles of Aguilar. For a discussion of Spinelli's treatment of Aguilar, see
Note, The Inforner's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CorNELL L. REv.
958 (1969).
7211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970).
8 In reference to the first element the court stated:
Clearly the affidavit in the instant case satisfies Aguilar's first requirement of
the test. The informant's information was based on personal observation and
participation in the defendant's illegal activity. The neutral and detached justice
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solely upon information supplied by an unnamed informant who stated
that he had not only observed marijuana in the apartment to be searched,
but also had bought some from the defendant and had smoked it there.2
Although earlier decisions showed a reluctance to find probable cause
where a warrant was not based on the personal knowledge or perception
of the affiant,'0 many dealt favorably with warrants based on the personal experience of an informant." More recently, despite the host of
facts used to reinforce affidavits,' 2 the courts have attached significant
of the peace could thus conclude that the allegations were based on facts, not
suspicion or rumor. Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 150, 176 S.E.2d 309,
313 (1970).
The court's reference to participation by the informant in the illegal activity raises
some question as to the weight the court attaches to the personal observation with
regard to the first element. For the court's treatment of the second element, see note 14
bnfra.
In concluding that probable cause had been shown the court gave considerable weight
to the fact that the informant was making an admission against interest, and that his
information was detailed in nature.
9 211 Va. at 147-149, 176 S.E.2d at 311 (1970). The relevant portion of the affidavit
as reprinted by the court was as follows:
The material facts constituting probable cause for issuance of the search
warrant. I have received information from a reliable informant who states that
he was at the apartment of Melvin Lloyd Manley, 313 West 27th Street, this past
week and he saw a large quantity of marijuana (a narcotic drug) in a chest in
the front room and also some marijuana was in a dresser drawer in the middle
room. My informer also states that in the past month he has smoked marijuana
in the apartment . . . and . . . has made two purchases of marijuana from
Melvin Lloyd Manley.
10 In earlier decisions an affidavit not based on the personal knowledge or perception
of the affiant was said to be founded on "information and belief." This fact alone did
not make the affidavit insufficient; rather, the failure to allege facts supporting the
information was considered a fatal flaw. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 18 F.2d 442
(D. Mont. 1927); People v. Billerbeck, 323 111. 48, 153 N.E. 586 (1926); Kranik v.
State, 204 Ind. 661, 185 N.E. 514 (1933); Drake v. State, 201 Ind. 235, 165 N.E. 757
(1929); Fugitt v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 768, 295 S.W. 1072 (1927); Standard v.
State, 113 Tex. Crim. 600, 21 S.W.2d 1066 (1929).
1
See, e.g., Turk v. State, 89 Ind. App. 30, 165 N.E. 558 (1929); Foley v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 691, 15 S.W.2d 444 (1929); Denzlinger v. State, - Tex. Crim. -,
28 S.W.2d 160 (1930). Accord, Litteral v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 573, 20 S.W.2d 457
(1929), where the court, holding information from an unnamed informant insufficient,
indicated that probable cause could exist only where the informant was identified.
'2The use of various corroborating facts in recent decisions involving personal
observation by informants has resulted in uncertainty as to the significance these courts
have attached to the fact that the informant was relating facts as an "eyewitness."
Invariably all the facts are considered together as constituting probable cause with
little elaboration on any one particular factor. See, e.g., Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528 (1964) (furs described in derail by informant matched only furs stolen
in past six months); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (petitioner was
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weight to the fact that an affidavit was based on the personal observation
of an informant. 3
Though void of any reasoning to support its conclusion, Manley states
that informant reliability may be established by the informant's statement
of facts as an "eyewitness." ' Such a result is clearly contrary to both reason
admitted drug user, and the informant had made an admission against interest); United
States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970) (information corroborated by surveillance by officers); United States v. Wood, 270 F. Supp. 963
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (serial numbers given by informant corresponded to those on typewriters recently stolen). But see Coyne v. Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio 1967),
which held that the description of an informer as an "eyewitness" gave strong evidence
for a magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed.
'3See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1970); Reynolds v. State, - Ala.
App. -, 238 So. 2d 557 (1970); People v. Akers, 9 Cal. App. 3d 96, - P.2d -,
87 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1970); People v. Peppers, - Colo. -, 475 P. 2d 337 (1970);
People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345 (1970). But see Holt v. State,
471 P.2d 957 (Okla. Crim. 1970), where it was held that an affidavit based solely
on information by an unnamed informant who purported to have personal knowledge
did not show probable cause.
14 211 Va. at 150, 176 S.E.2d at 313. The court stated:
[Tlhe credibility of the informer or the reliability of his information may be
shown in other ways. Reliability may be found in an informant's statement of
facts as an "eyewitness."
The above material is the only treatment given this matter by the court. To ascertain
the reasoning used to arrive at this conclusion reference must be made to the argument
of the Commonwealth. The similarities between the court's opinion and the Commonwealth's brief indicate that the court closely followed the latter. The Commonwealh
bases its argument that informant reliability is established by the statement of facts as
an "eyewitness" on a broad construction of the disjunctive phraseology of the second
element of Aguilar. This phraseology requires that the affiant show that the "...
informant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable" (emphasis added). Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). The Commonwealth maintained that this disjunctive
phraseology permits the use of collateral material such as eyewitness accounts to
establish informant reliability. Brief for Commonwealth at 12-14, Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176 S.E.2d 309 (1970). Such a construction is totally beyond
that intended by Aguitar, and later Spinelli. Examination of Spinelli, particularly the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 423
(1969),

discloses that a narrow application of the phrase ".

.

. or his information

'reliable" was intended. The Court intended that this phraseology refer to instances
where the informant's information had been independently corroborated. The corroboration could be by officers or by other means.
In Manley two principals were presented on which to determine reliability. In
addition to the "eyewitness" character of the informer, the court discussed "admission
against interest" as another basis for ascertaining reliability. The court's language
implied, however, that the first basis alone was sufficient to establish reliability. 211 Va.
at 151, 176 S.E.2d at 313.
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and the decisions following the Aguilar test." Those decisions which have
dealt with eyewitness accounts have not used them to establish informant
reliability, but rather to fulfill Aguilar's first element.' 6 These decisions
have used various other averments to establish the informant's reliability."
In attempting to determine an informant's reliability the neutral magistrate is equipped only with those facts supplied by the affiant-officer.'
Because the facts in question are usually conveyed to the magistrate by
15 See United States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1970);
People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App. 2d 134, 47 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1965). See also Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745 (5th Cit.
1970); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cit. 1966); United States v. Wood,
270 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. Akers, 9 Cal. App. 3d 96, - P.2d -,
87 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1970); People v. Schmidt, - Colo. -, 473 P.2d 698 (1970); People
v. Mitchell, 45 IlM.2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345 (1970); People v. Perlman, - Ill. App. 2d
262, N.E.2d 253 (1970); People v. Asaro, - App. Div. 2d -, - N.E.2d -,
-,
312 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1970); cf. State v. White, - Ariz. App. -, 475 P.2d 750 (1970).
But see McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1969); Coyne v. Watson, 282
F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
Mr. Justice Gordon in his concurring opinion in Manley stated in reference to the
court's language that an informant's statement of facts as an "eyewitness" may establish
reliability, that ". . . reason militates against such a conclusion." 211 Va. 146, 152, 176
S.E.2d 309, 314 (1970) (concurring opinion). Justice Gordon concurred in the result
because he felt the informer's reliability had, been established by his admission against
interest.
1o See cases cited note 15 supra.
Mr. Justice White, concurring in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1970),
gives a clear indication of the role the court intended informant eyewitness accounts
to play in the Aguilar test. Justice White stated:
If the affidavit rests on hearsay-an informant's report-what is necessary under
Aguilar is one of two things: the informant must declare ... that he has himself
seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted . . . . since the report, although
hearsay, purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers on the
honesty of the informant, and that worry is dissipated by the officer's previous
experience with the informant.
17The most frequently used averment has been that the informant has supplied
information in the past which was proven credible or resulted in conviction. See, e.g.,
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); People v. Peppers, - Colo. -, 475
P.2d 337 (1970); Merritt v. State, - Ga. App. -, 175 S2E.2d 890 (1970), People v.
Bryant, - Ill. App. 2d -, 261 N.E.2d 815 (1970). For other allegations frequently
used to support reliability see, e.g., United States ex rel. Kislin v. New Jersey, 429 F.2d
950 (3d Cir. 1970) (independent surveillance made by police); United States v.
Castle, 213 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.C. 1962) (where the informant's allegations constituted
an admission against interest); Johnson v. State, 121 Ga. App. 477, 174 SE.2d 246
(1970) (informant was a government agent.); People v. Montague, 19 N.Y.2d 121, 224
N.E.2d 873, 278 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1967) (informant turned over to police marijuana he
obtained from the defendant).
18 See, e.g., People v. Peppers, - Colo. -, 475 P.2d 337 (1970); People v. Baird,
- Colo. -, 470 P.2d 20 (1970).
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the affiant, it is rare that an informant has any personal contact with the
magistrate.1" On the contrary, frequently, as in Manley, the magistrate
does not even know the identity of the informant." Undoubtedly under such
circumstances the imagination of a magistrate would be taxed to conclude
that the informant was truthful in his accusations simply because he has
supplied facts alleging that they were the product of his personal observations.
The fact that many nameless informers have at some time been engaged
in some form of illegal activity further illustrates the unreasonableness of
the court's conclusion.21 The very nature of an informer's activities and
associations leaves his credibility subject to doubt. 2 There are countless
reasons why an informer would concoct a totally fallacious accusation.3
If Manley's "eyewitness" conclusion were followed, such an accusation
could become the basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Certainly Manley was justified in using an eyewitness account to fulfill Aguilar's first element.2" This portion of the test is designed to insure
19 See, e.g., Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal
Courts, 53 CALIF. L. Rrv. 840, 841 (1965).
20 For cases and discussion of the informer's privilege of nondisclosure and the
problems encountered by the use of undisclosed informer's, see 8 VIGMORE, supra
note 3; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262, 271 (1961); Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a
Search
Warrant, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1529 (1967); Quinn, supra note 3.
21
The growth of illegal drug traffic has given rise to a great many informers who
are known to either use or sell drugs. See Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924
(D.C.C. 1959). See also United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Brandon v.
United States, 270 F.2d 311 (D.C.C. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943 (1959); Smith v.
United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C.C. 1958), cert denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); United
States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 761 (1944).
The informant's illegal activity is not confined solely to drug traffic. Informant's
have been known to engage in every illegal activity from prostitution to pickpocketing.
See generally Donnelly, supra note 3, at 1094.
22See United States v. Irby, 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830
(1962).
...[The informer] was shown to be a man of unstable character and credibility.
It is from persons of this type rather than from the law-abiding that information
as to the violation of the law is likely to be obtained .... Id. at 283.
23 There have been instances where informant's have been known to receive money,
sentence reductions and even drugs as rewards for information supplied by them.
Under these conditions it is to be expected that the temptation to concoct fallacious
accusations will be great. See Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924 (D.C.C. 1959); Note,
Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1529 (1967).
There are various judicial statutes which provide for compensation to informers
who supply information concerning criminal activity. The activities vary from
narcotic drug to custom law violations. See Quinn, supra note 3, at 402 n.18.
24 See note 7 supra.
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that the informant is making a valid appraisal of the facts before coming
to a conclusion. Logically, an informant's detailed account of what he
purports to have actually seen would be sufficient to assure a magistrate
that the informant was not merely arriving at unwarranted inferences or
conclusions; though further facts would be required to show that he or his
statements were credible.
Aguilar's requirement that the informant's honesty be proven is a crucial
factor in safeguarding against unwarranted searches.2" The ruling in
Manley concerning eyewitness accounts is illogical and without support.
The apparent weakness of this decision and its inherent dangers make
it imperative that the court reconsider the validity of its conclusion.
D.E.E.

25 See, e.g., Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest,
54 CoR _Lrm
L. REv. 958 (1969); Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant,
67 COLUm. L. REv. 1529, 1534 (1967).

